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Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the Myth
Richard C. Reuben*
I. INTRODUCTION
Confidentiality has long been part of the mythology of alternative
dispute resolution (ADR). That is to say, one of the apparent virtues of
ADR is that its processes have been viewed as confidential.
This aspect of the mythology has come under more scrutiny in recent
years, particularly in the mediation context.2 This is not surprising
considering the popularity of mediation 3  and the centrality of
confidentiality to the mediation process. 4  Confidentiality was the
primary thrust of the Uniform Mediation Act (UMA), 5 and in their
* Richard C. Reuben is an associate professor of law at the University of Missouri-Columbia
School of Law. I would like to thank Chris Drahozal, Steve Ware, and the members of the Kansas
Law Review for inviting me to participate in this symposium, and all of the symposium participants
for their helpful comments. I would also like to thank Bob Bailey, Frank Bowman, Steve Easton,
David Fischer, Wilson Freyermuth, Ed Hunvald, Bruce Meyerson, Charley Pou, Alan Rau, Len
Riskin, Jean Stemlight, and Jim Westbrook for their helpful insights and comments, and Andrew
Funk and Amy French for their valuable research assistance. Any errors or omissions are my own.
Finally, I would like to thank the Webb R. Gilmore Faculty Research Fund, the John R. Weisenfels
Research Fund, the David Yates Faculty Research Fund, and the University of Missouri-Columbia
School of Law Foundation for their financial support.
1. See LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 13-18 (3rd ed.
2005); KATHERINE V. W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 2-8 (2000) (noting the growth of conflict resolution in private tribunals); STEPHEN
GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 210
(4th ed. 2003) ("privacy" of the process is one of the "theoretical advantages of arbitration"; CARRIE
MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 449 (2005)
(stating "arbitration is often a private process"); ALAN SCOTT RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 601 (3d ed. 2002) (stating "the privacy of the process may
also contribute to a lessening of hostility and confrontation. An arbitration hearing (unlike a trial) is
not open to the public"); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO.
L.J. 2619, 2648-58 (1995) (decrying privatized justice).
2. A Westlaw search of articles in the JLR database mentioning "mediation confidentiality"
in the title found fourteen articles published in the decade between Jan. 1, 1986, and Jan. 1, 1996.
By contrast, more than sixty articles were published between Jan. 1, 1996 and Jan. 1, 2006,
according to the same search. Search conducted Jan. 23, 2006.
3. Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 54 (describing
emergence of mediation as the leading form of alternative dispute resolution in the United States).
4. See RISKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 439-64; SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW,
POLICY, PRACTICE 9:1-9:2 (2d ed. 2005).
5. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (amended 2003), 7A U.L.A. 104, 106 (Supp. 2005) (stating in the
Prefatory Note that "a central thrust of the Act is to provide a privilege that assures confidentiality in
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supporting research, the UMA drafters took a hard look at the law of
mediation confidentiality and found a much more nuanced picture than
the mythology would suggest..
In fact, the UMA research found little legal support for the familiar
proposition that everything "stays in the room" in mediation. To the
contrary, it found that the law distinguished between private promises
not to disclose mediation communications to third persons (agreements
that the law would enforce through the law of contract) and promises to
keep mediation communications from being discovered or introduced
into evidence (agreements that the law would not enforce on grounds of
public policy).7 A primary goal for the drafters was therefore simply to
make state law consistent with widely held expectations with respect to
confidentiality by enacting an evidentiary privilege for mediation
communications and reaffirming state laws permitting parties to contract
for non-disclosure agreements as to third parties.8
Confidentiality in arbitration has not yet received similar scrutiny.
Prior to this symposium, there was not a single law review article
dedicated to the discussion of arbitration confidentiality and familiar
arbitration treatises considered it only in passing. 9 But the time has come
for a principled and rigorous analysis of arbitration confidentiality. Like
mediation, arbitration has become a permanent fixture of the landscape
of civil justice. 1° Like mediation, arbitration is often promoted as a
"private" or "confidential" process, raising some moral and perhaps
ethical obligations on the part of the profession to be candid with
consumers as to the meaning and limitations of arbitration
confidentiality." Such candor is important because courts have begun to
legal proceedings (see Sections 4-6)"). In the interest of full disclosure, I served as a reporter for the
Act.
6. Id. § 4 cmt. 2(a).
7. Id. §§ 4-6 (privilege) and § 8 (confidentiality).
8. Id. at 109.
9. See, e.g., 3 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS,
AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 32.6.1 (Supp. 1999) ("A much-vaunted
advantage of arbitration is the relative privacy of the proceedings .... There is, however, no
absolute right to confidentiality.").
10. See RISKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 507-10; STONE, supra note 1, at 303 (arbitration is used
frequently in commercial disputes and in collective bargaining settings).
11. See, e.g., MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 9 ("Although a party maybe protected to some
degree[,]... parties may still be able to obtain transcripts of sworn testimony, if any, from the
arbitration for use in later proceedings."); Andre R. Imbrogno, Arbitration as an Alternative to
Divorce Litigation: Redefining the Judicial Role, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 413, 418-19 (2003) (noting
that arbitration provides "the opportunity for resolution of sensitive matters in a private and informal
forum"); Josef Rohlik, Arbitration as a Model for Resolution of Health Care Disputes Between
Health Care Professionals and Health Care Organizations, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1005, 1006-07
(1997) (discussing reasons for the recent increase in arbitration hearings).
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receive challenges to arbitration confidentiality, 12 and more can be
expected in the future as both voluntary and mandatory arbitration
continue to expand and become more institutionalized.1 3 For all of these
reasons, more descriptive and normative analysis of arbitration
confidentiality is timely and important, so that wise legal policy may
follow.
This Article takes a look at the assumption of confidentiality in
arbitration. I focus in particular on the question of whether an arbitration
may be invaded for the purpose of discovering and admitting "arbitration
communications"-statements made in arbitration and documents
introduced in arbitration-in other formal legal proceedings.14  For
example, may an attorney engaged in employment litigation against a
corporation subpoena documents, records, and testimony from an
arbitration involving that corporation and a different employee? The
question is deceptively simple, with potentially significant ramifications
for the integrity of the arbitration process. If the answer is yes, and
arbitrations may be freely canvassed for evidence that may be useful in
other cases, then arbitrations conducted in good faith can become fishing
holes for well-funded litigants in other cases-to the exploitation of the
parties and the process. If on the other hand the answer is no, and
arbitration communications are protected against discoverability and
admissibility, then arbitrations can be exploited as safe havens in which
to hide evidence that might be helpful or necessary for litigants and
courts. Because both of these prospects undermine the legitimacy of the
arbitration process, I will propose that arbitration policy steer a middle
path, one that respects both the justice system's need for relevant
evidence and the need of parties in arbitration to a reliable level of
confidentiality.
There are a few important limitations to this inquiry. Initially, I do
not consider the capacity of private parties to agree by contract not to
disclose arbitration communications to third persons outside the context
12. See infra discussion Part 11.
13. Indeed, one study has found that mandatory arbitration provisions are now found in more
than one-third of the standard form contracts analyzed. See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler,
"Volunteering" to Arbitrate through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's
Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62-64 (2004).
14. To develop this term, I borrowed from the language used to describe mediation
communications in the Uniform Mediation Act. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 2 (amended 2003). The
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act also uses this convention to describe "dispute resolution
communications." Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736
(1990) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.A. § 571 et seq. (1996)).
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of formal legal proceedings. The Article in this symposium by Professor
Schmitz addresses that topic well, allowing me to limit my consideration
of arbitration confidentiality to the discovery and admissibility of
arbitration communications evidence. 15  I further limit my focus to
arbitrations conducted under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 16 and
related state laws, which are generally modeled after the Uniform
Arbitration Act, 17 and therefore do not consider arbitrations arising under
collective bargaining statutes, the Federal Railway Labor Act, or any
other federal or state arbitration statutes. While these other contexts are
important, the FAA by far has been the source of the most significant
growth in recent years, especially in the employment and consumer
areas.' 8  Finally, I give only limited consideration to international
arbitration in my analysis, as that topic is given more focused study in
this symposium by Professors Rogers and Coe.19
In Part II of this Article, I provide an overview of the present state of
the law of arbitration confidentiality and find that there are relatively few
statutory or other prohibitions on the discovery or admissibility of
arbitration communications. In Part III, I turn to the normative question
of whether arbitration communications under the FAA should be
confidential when individuals seek to discover and admit arbitration
communications in other formal proceedings. To this end, I discuss the
key characteristics of the arbitration process affecting confidentiality, the
history, structure, and doctrine of the Federal Arbitration Act, as well as
pragmatic and democratic considerations. I conclude that permitting
broad discovery and admissibility of arbitrations would frustrate the
unambiguous intent of Congress in enacting the FAA, contradict well-
established doctrine that has arisen under the FAA, thwart the reasonable
expectations of parties in arbitration, and give rise to potential abuses of
the arbitration process.
I then explore the ways in which evidence law has protected the
confidentiality of communications in other alternative dispute resolution
15. Amy Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1211
(2006).
16. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1999 and Supp. 2003).
17. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, 7 U.L.A.1 (2005). Since there are some variations among state
adoptions of the Uniform Arbitration Act, and the Act itself was significantly revised in 2001 but has
not been adopted in its revised form by a significant number of states as of this writing, I will use the
Uniform Arbitration Act as the touchstone of analysis throughout this article.
18. See RISKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 582-607 (providing excerpts of cases arising under the
FAA); Stephen K. Huber & E. Wendy Trachte-Huber, Top 10 Developments in Arbitration in the
1990s, DISP. RESOL. J., Jan. 2001, at 24, 30-31 (discussing consumer arbitration).
19. Jack J. Coe, Jr., Transparency in the Resolution of Investor-State Disputes-Adoption,
Adaptation and NAFTA Leadership, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1339 (2006); CATHERINE A. ROGERS,
Transparency in International CommercialArbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1301 (2006).
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processes, specifically negotiation and mediation, and find those
evidentiary structures-the settlement discussions rule and the
privilege-unsuitable for extension to arbitration. In discerning a more
appropriate vehicle, I underscore the importance of integrating
arbitration confidentiality into the fabric of the law in a way that
preserves and enhances arbitration's virtues, while at the same time
doing no harm to the arbitration process or the values of public law.
20
This leads me to suggest the modest step of raising the burden of proof
for the admission of evidence sought from arbitration proceedings by
requiring the proponent of such evidence to demonstrate that it is
otherwise unavailable and necessary for the resolution of the case.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT LAW OF ARBITRATION
CONFIDENTIALITY
The notion of arbitration confidentiality is inherently ambiguous and
therefore potentially confusing. This Part addresses that ambiguity
before proceeding to discuss the contours of the statutory and common
law environment of arbitration confidentiality.
A. Arbitration and the Meaning ofArbitration Confidentiality
Arbitration under the FAA and related state laws is an adjudicatory
process, meaning that it is a process in which a neutral third party renders
a final and binding decision upon a dispute that has been submitted to the
arbitrator by disputing parties.2' Its adjudicatory nature makes it similar
to public trial, but it is less formal in a number of important respects. For
example, formal rules of evidence and civil procedure generally do not
apply in FAA arbitrations.22 Similarly, FAA arbitration is generally
considered a "private" process.23 What that means, however, is less clear.
20. For an example of this kind of process-sensitive integration in the constitutional context,
see Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1046-1101 (2000) [hereinafter Reuben,
Constitutional Gravity].
21. See RISKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 506-11.
22. STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2.37 (2001); MARVIN F. HILL JR.
& ANTHONY V. SINICROPI, EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION 4 (2d ed. 1980).
23. For an argument that arbitration under the FAA can be a public process, see generally
Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of ADR, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577
(1997) [hereinafter Reuben, Public Justice]; Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 20, at 989-
1017.
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At a minimum, it means that arbitration proceedings are not
conducted in public, unlike public trials. This understanding only
scratches the surface. A crucial distinction, for example, must be drawn
between the "privacy" of the arbitral proceeding and the
"confidentiality" of the proceeding. 4 The privacy of the proceeding
refers to the ability of uninvited third parties-such as former spouses,
business partners, and the media-to access and observe the proceedings,
and perhaps disclose those observations, without the consent of the
disputing parties, and possibly the arbitrator.25 The confidentiality of the
proceeding, however, refers to the ability of the disputing parties, the
arbitrator, witnesses, and others who attended the arbitration to disclose
publicly oral statements made in arbitration, documents tendered in
arbitration, or observations of conduct by parties, witnesses, and
26
arbitrators during the course of the arbitration.
When considering confidentiality of arbitration communications, yet
another important distinction must be drawn between disclosures to third
persons in the general public and disclosures to institutions in the context
of formal legal proceedings. Disclosures to third persons in the general
public include a wide range of possibilities-from disclosures to spouses,
family members and friends to business partners and competitors, and
students in classrooms and training sessions. Since these disclosures are
in the private realm, the law historically has permitted parties to regulate
them through the law of contract,27 and that law is generally well-
developed. 28 Disclosures in the context of formal legal proceedings can
also take many forms, such as disclosure pursuant to a deposition or in
24. Schmitz, supra note 15, at 1214. Most ADR casebooks treat privacy as a possible
advantage of arbitration. See supra note 1, and sources cited therein.
25. The question of who would have the power to exclude third persons has not yet been
considered by courts or scholarly literature. Both the FAA and the UAA give arbitrators broad
discretion to run arbitration proceedings. See, e.g., FAA, §§ 7 and 10; UAA §§ 5, 7, and 12.
However, the arbitrator's authority to act derives from the parties' submission of the dispute to the
arbitrator. While it is clear that the parties can agree to withdraw all or part of the dispute from the
arbitrator, whether the parties can agree to override the arbitrator's judgment on a procedural
issues-such as the presence of a third party-is an interesting question worth further study, but is
beyond the scope of this article.
26. Observation evidence is more controversial than verbal or written statements in that an
observation generally is not considered a statement unless intended as a statement. See, e.g., FED. R.
EVID. 801(a)(1) (defining "statement" for purposes of hearsay rule); UNIF. R. EVID. 801 (a)(3)
(same).
27. See Schmitz, supra note 15, at 1241-42. As Professor Schmitz rightly observes, important
questions can be raised about the degree to which private parties may contract for non-disclosure of
arbitration communications, and thereby use the arbitration proceedings to prevent the public from
learning about matters of public concern, such as threats to health and safety. Such questions are
beyond the scope of this article. Id.; see also MACNEIL, ET AL., supra note 9, § 32.6.2 (explaining
standard arbitration rules).
28. Schmitz, supra note 15, at 1241-42.
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response to a discovery request, testimony during a trial, as well as the
work of other public bodies, such as investigations and hearings by
administrative agencies, legislatures, and grand juries. Unlike
disclosures to third persons generally, which implicate private interests,
disclosures in formal legal proceedings implicate public interests-
specifically, the public's interest in accessing the information pursuant to
governmental fact-finding, adjudication, or policy development and legal
regulation. These disclosures in formal legal proceedings are the focus
of this Article, and as we will see, the law has given scant consideration
to the availability of seemingly private arbitration communications
evidence in this public context.
B. Statutes and Court Rules
The Federal Arbitration Act and related state laws provide a basic
structure for arbitrations conducted under them, but generally do not
address issues of arbitration confidentiality. 29 There has been some
federal and state regulation, but it has been minimal.
1. The Federal Sphere
Apart from a small handful of local rules, 30 there are no meaningful
federal court rules on confidentiality in arbitration.
Congress, however, has provided some guidance, at least with
respect to arbitrations involving federal agencies. The confidentiality
provisions of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 (ADR
Act) apply to all federal administrative agencies, and regulate the
discovery and admissibility of arbitration communications as "dispute
resolution communications.' Section 574 of the Act provides a general
rule that neither parties nor arbitrators may be compelled to disclose
arbitration communications without consent,32  prior disclosure,33
29. MACNEILETAL., supra note 9, § 32.6.1.
30. E.g., D. IDAHO R. 16.5(j) (2005) (arbitration proceedings confidential); D. MAss. BANKR.
R. 7016-1 (a) (bankruptcy), available at http://www.mab.uscourts.gov/pdfdocuments/LR05.pdf, E.D.
TENN. R. 16.5(h) (court-related), available at http://www.tned.uscourts.gov/documents/localrules/
localrules.pdf; S.D. TEX. R. 16.4.1 (court-related) available at http://www.txs.uscourts.ogv/dclclrl/
dclr2005.pdf.
31. 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-84 (2000). The Act does not address disclosures to the general public.
32. § 574(a)(1), (b)(2).
33. § 574(a)(2), (b)(3).
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statutory obligation,34 or judicial determination that such disclosure is
necessary.35
While the Act appears quite strong, its force in the arbitration context
is blunted significantly by its practical operation. Most agencies do not
use arbitration for a variety of historical, cultural, and legal reasons.
Those seeking to do so under the ADR Act's authority must, "in
consultation with the Attorney General . . . issue guidance on the
appropriate use of binding arbitration" unless the agency has other
explicit statutory authority to use arbitration.3 6  Only a very small
handful of agencies have sought or received this authority.37
Even then, there are significant constraints on the protections of
Section 574. For one, the Act has potentially broad exceptions, such as
to "prevent a manifest injustice" or to "help establish a violation of
law."3 8 More importantly, perhaps, the scope of the protection against
compelled disclosure by a party (as opposed to disclosure by a neutral)
extends only to communications that are not "available" to both parties.39
34. § 574(a)(3), (b)(4).
35. § 574(a)(4), (b)(5).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 575(c). See generally JEFFREY M. SENGER, FEDERAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 41-
45 (2004) (discussing process for arbitration in cases involving federal government); PHYLLIS
HANFLING & MARTHA MCCLELLAN, DEVELOPING GUIDANCE FOR BINDING ARBITRATION (DOJ
1999), available at http://adr.gov/arbitra.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2006). Binding arbitration
occasionally is authorized by an agency's organic statute. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §7123(b)(2)
(authorizing Internal Revenue Service to enter into binding arbitration for certain tax disputes); 42
U.S.C. § 9622(h)(2) (authorizing the Environmental Protection Agency to enter into binding
arbitration for certain cost-recovery claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act); and 5 U.SC. §7101 (authorizing binding arbitration for certain
disputes arising under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978).
37. Id. at 41-42, n.34. Only three agencies have received approval for arbitration programs:
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and
the Federal Aviation Administration. SENGER, supra note 36, at 352 n. 34.
38. 5 U.S.C. § 574(a)(4) and (b)(5) permit courts considerable latitude in lifting the veil of
confidentiality upon a finding that "such testimony or disclosure is necessary to--
(A) prevent a manifest injustice;
(B) help establish a violation of law; or
(C) prevent harm to the public health or safety,
of sufficient magnitude in the particular case to outweigh the integrity of dispute resolution
proceedings in general by reducing the confidence of parties in future cases that their
communications will remain confidential."
While the language of the three categories of exceptions is broad, it is important to note that
the balancing requirement that follows them applies to all three categories and does help to mitigate
the potential breadth of the exception. Moreover, the courts have generally respected the Act's clear
intention that such communications not be received into evidence unless necessary. Email from
Charles Pou, Jr., Dispute Resolution Services, Washington, D.C.; former director, Dispute
Resolution Program, Administrative Conference of the U.S., to Richard C. Reuben (Nov. 30, 2006,
09:35 EST) (on file with author).
39. 5 U.S.C. § 574(b)(7) provides an exception to the general rule of confidentiality if "the
dispute resolution communication was provided to or was available to all parties to the dispute
resolution proceeding" unless "the dispute resolution communication was generated by the neutral."
The operation of this provision is easier to understand in the mediation context, where it protects the
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In other words, if the communication is made in the presence of two or
more parties, then the protections of the Act do not apply. Since most
arbitration hearings are conducted in joint session (unlike many
mediations that use the private caucus format), the protection of Section
574 would only be available for responses to questions asked by the
arbitrator during the typical joint arbitration session. It would not apply
to preclude discovery or admissibility of other communications rendered
during the arbitration joint session, such as normal testimony and
documents-arguably the majority of arbitration communications.
In sum, arbitration is relatively rare in the federal government.
When it is used, arbitration communications are protected under the
ADR Act. But that protection is constrained, generally limited to
communications responding to questions by the arbitrator because of the
structure of most arbitrations. Even then, the confidentiality of the
arbitration communication is subject to significant discretion vested in
courts to receive such evidence.
2. The State Sphere
There is surprisingly little protection for arbitration confidentiality in
the states. Fewer than half of the states address the issue in either
statutes or court rules; a couple of jurisdictions even make it clear that
arbitrations are not confidential. 40 This is in stark contrast to the more
than 250 state statutes and court rules affecting mediation
confidentiality.
41
Only seventeen states have statutes that provide any protection to
arbitration confidentiality with respect to discovery and admissibility. Of
these, only four have statutes that apply to arbitrations generally,
regardless of subject matter: Arkansas,42 California,43 Missouri,44 and
Texas.45  The other thirteen states have enacted legislation providing
communications made in private caucuses between the mediator and a party, but not
communications that are made in joint session.
40. GA. DEKALB COUNTY INTERNAL OPERATING P. APP. B R. (8), available at
http://www.co.dekalb.ga.us/superior/index.htm; GA. FULTON COUNTY R. 1000 8(a), (c), available at
http://fultoncourt.org/lawlibrary/pdf/localruIes.pdf; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.3 (2005) (state
agencies).
41. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (amended 2003), 7A U.L.A. 104, 106 (Supp. 2005).
42. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-206 (1999).
43. CAL. EVID. CODE § 703.5 (West 1995).
44. MO. ANN. STAT. § 435.014 (West 1992).
45. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073 (Vernon 2005).
1263
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such protections for specific types of arbitrations, such as court-related,46
consumer, or health-care arbitrations: California,
47  Connecticut,48
Georgia,4 9 Kansas,50 Maryland,51 Missouri,52  Nebraska,53 New Jersey,54
North Carolina,55 South Carolina, 56 Tennessee, 57 Utah, 58 Virginia,59 and
Wisconsin. 60  Both general and subject-matter-specific statutes include
exceptions that vary widely. Not one has been interpreted judicially as
of this writing.
Court rules are similarly sparse: only sixteen states have at least one
court rule affecting arbitration confidentiality, many of which are limited
to attorneys fees, or in the case of South Carolina, law firm disputes.61
46. Court-related arbitrations are almost always non-binding because of constitutional
concerns. See RISKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 714-15; Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute
Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. REv. 487, 502-05 (1989) (discussing
the right to jury trials).
47. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 471.5 (West 2006) (consumer affairs); CAL. GOv'T CODE §
11420.30 (West 2005) (administrative adjudications); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6200 (h) (West
2006) (attorney fees).
48. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-195b (West 2006) (motor vehicle).
49. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34A-3 (2005) (health care); GA. ALT. DISP. RESOL. R. VII (2005)
(court-related).
50. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-512, 60-452a (2005) (court-related).
51. MD. ALT. DIsP. RESOL. R. 17-105.1(c )(2) (West 2005) (permitting parties to contract for
arbitration privilege in court-related cases); MD. CODE art. 49B, § 48 (2006) (human relations).
52. MO. REV. STAT. § 436.362 (West 2005); MO. SUP. CT. R. 17.06 (a) (West 2006) (residential
construction defects). Note that Missouri appears on both the general and subject-matter specific
lists because it has both types of statutes.
53. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-168 (2005) (worker's compensation).
54. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:48A-7.12 (e)(3), 17:48F-8.4(e)(3), 17:48E-10(l)(e)(3), 17:48F-13.1,
26:2J-8.1 (West Supp. 2005) (medical claims, if provider rules permit); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:9DD-
10 (West 2001) (civil rights).
55. N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 132-1.3 (West 2005) (government actions involving medical
malpractice).
56. S.C. CIR. CT. R. 9(c) (2005) (court-related program arbitrators not to be called as witness).
57. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-1-138(b), 63-4-115(g), 63-6-214, 63-7-115 (West 2004 & Supp.
2005) (complaints against physicians, chiropractors, surgeons, and nurses).
58. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-5(3)(m), 3(n) (2002) (court-related); UTAH CT. R. 102(k)
(2005) (court-related).
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-576.10 (West Supp. 2005) (court-related civil remedies)
(theoretically applicable to arbitration but programs covered by statute do not offer arbitration as
dispute resolution option).
60. WISC. STAT. ANN. § 93.50 (e) (West Supp. 2005) (farming).
61. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.3(b)(4) (2006) (consumer); CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE §
6200(H) (2006) (attorneys fees); FLA. B. R. 14-7.1(b) (West Supp. 2006) (attorneys fees); GA. R. &
REGS. ST. B. R. 6-701 (2005) (attorneys fees); IND. A.D.R. 3.4(E) (LexisNexis 2006) (court-related
arbitrations confidential and treated like settlement discussions); ME. R. CIv. PRO. 16B(k) (court-
related); ME. B. R. 90) (2005) (attorneys fees); MT. R. ON ARB. OF FEE DisP. 9.1 (2005) (attorneys
fees); N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 170 (F)(1) (2005) (court-related non-binding arbitration); N.Y. R. § 137.10
(McKinney 2005) (attorneys fees); N.C. B. R. Ch. 1, Subehap. E, § .0409 (2005) (law firm disputes);
S.C. R., CIR. CT. A.D.R. 9(c) (2005) (court-related); TENN. S. CT. R. 31, App. B (2005) (court-
related); UTAH R.C.A.D.R. 102 (2006) (court-related non-binding arbitration); VT. R.
CIV. PRO. 16.3(g) (2005) (court-related).
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Also, court rules whose protections are limited to court-related non-
binding arbitration programs show up in five states: Georgia, Indiana,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.62
The context limitations of the court rules are significant. While
several are in states that also provide some statutory protections,
arbitrations in those states that have only court rules have no prohibitions
on discovery or admissibility for arbitrations that are not specifically
covered by the court rule. The same holds true for subject matter
specific statutes. For example, the state of New York-a major locus of
U.S. arbitration-has no statutory protections, and its statewide court
rule is limited to arbitrations of disputes over attorneys fees. This means
that communications arising from commercial, consumer, employment,
and other arbitrations covered under the FAA may be fully discoverable
and admissible in New York
In sum, the pattern in the states appears to be that the discovery and
admissibility of arbitration communications is generally unconstrained
by statutes, with the exception of some court-related arbitration and
attorney-fee dispute programs. Only a small handful of states provide
general protections by statute, while several provide limited protections
in subject-matter-specific statutes and court rules, and the rest-the large
majority of states-leave the issue to the common law.
C. The Common Law
To date, few cases address the discovery and admissibility of
arbitration communications, all of which have been rulings from the
lower federal and state courts.63
1. Federal Cases
The federal cases have largely been decided under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(c), which generally permits federal judges to impose
protective orders when "justice requires to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.
64
62. GA. R. & REGS. ST. B. R. 6-701 (amended 1988); IND. A.D.R. 3.4(E) (amended 2005); N.H.
SUP. CT. R. 170(F)(I)(amended 2003); R.I. U.S. DIST. CT. A.D.R. Plan IX(E)(7)(d) (amended 2006);
VT. R. Civ. PRO. 16.3(g) (amended 2005).
63. There are also a few cases that deal with the application of attorney-client privilege and the
work-product doctrine in arbitration. See infra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
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The leading case-indeed the only reported federal case-is United
States v. Panhandle Eastern Corp.,65 in which the court held that
arbitration communications are discoverable and admissible and refused
to grant an order protecting them under Rule 26(c).66 In that case,
Panhandle Eastern, a pipeline company, sought to prevent the disclosure
of documents relating to an international arbitration held in Geneva,
Switzerland, fearing that such disclosure would harm its international
business relationships.67 The discovery request was for "all documents"
relating to the arbitration "including briefs, correspondence, and other
papers filed" with the arbitrator, depositions, transcripts of hearings,
settlement proposals, inter- and intra-company documents, and other
communications. 68 Applying circuit authority on the nature of "good
cause" under Rule 26(c), including the requirement of specific examples
of the harm that will be suffered by disclosure, the district court held that
Panhandle Eastern failed to meet its burden of proof in establishing
"good cause" for the protective order.69  In so doing, the court
specifically rejected the arguments that internal arbitration rules require
confidentiality or that a "general understanding" of confidentiality by the
parties could justify a protective order.70 The court also rejected general
assertions of economic harm that might be caused by disclosure as
inadequate to establish good cause. 71 The court's rejection of these
arguments is significant because they are the types of arguments that are
likely to be raised in future cases on arbitration confidentiality, and the
court's reflexive repudiation of them suggests other courts may be
similarly unreceptive.
Panhandle Eastern Corp. generally has been followed in principle, if
not in name, by other federal district courts that have considered the
issue in unreported decisions. In Contship Containerlines, Ltd. v. PPG
Industries, Inc.,72 the district court compelled the discovery of arbitration
communications from an international commercial arbitration held in
London. The court rejected the argument that confidentiality is
somehow implied at law as a part of the agreement to arbitrate. 73 This
holding departs from English decisions holding that the duty of
65. 118 F.R.D. 346 (D. Del. 1988).
66. Id. at 349-51.
67. Id. at 347.
68. Id. at 348.
69. Id. at 349 (citing Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986)).
70. Id. at 350.
71. Id.
72. No. 00 Civ. 0194 RCCH BP, 2003 WL 1948807 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2003).
73. Id. at *1.
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confidentiality is implied at law from the agreement to arbitrate, as a
necessary predicate for the operation of the arbitration process.1
4
In its ruling, the Contship Containerlines court also noted the lack of
external constraints on the disclosure of arbitration communications by
the parties, such as a contractual confidentiality agreement between the
parties, or the rule of an arbitral body prohibiting such disclosures. It is
unclear what effect such facts, if established, might have had on the
court's decision. The Panhandle Eastern decision suggests that internal
arbitration rules likely would not have been persuasive since the
Panhandle Eastern court rejected that argument much in the manner of
the private arbitration equivalent of local court rules.7 5 As a result, if it
was decided under Panhandle Eastern, the outcome in Contship
Containerlines would likely have been the same: The arbitration
communications evidence would have been discovered and admitted into
evidence.
Neither the Panhandle Eastern court nor the Contship
Containerlines court dealt with situations in which the parties had
executed a confidentiality agreement. However, in Lawrence E. Jaffee
Pension Plan v. Household International, Inc.,76 also an unpublished
decision, the parties had an explicit confidentiality provision in the
arbitration agreement, and the court still compelled the production of
arbitration communications evidence. In that case, the defendant sought
to quash a subpoena duces tecum seeking "'all documents in and
concerning the [arbitration] entitled Sheila M. Hennessy and Marc B.
Tull v. Household Finance. . . ."'77 The court found that the parties
reached an agreement to "treat as confidential" all documents disclosed
by the parties in connection with the arbitration, and that the arbitrator
74. See, e.g., Dolling-Baker v. Merrett, 1 W.L.R. 1205, 1213 (A.C. 1990) (Eng.) ("As between
parties to an arbitration,. . their very nature is such that there must... be some implied obligation
on both parties not to disclose or use for any other purpose any documents prepared for and used in
the arbitration .... ); Hassneh Ins. Co. of Israel v. Mew, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 243, 246 (Q.B. 1993) (An
obligation of confidentiality attaching to documents "can exist only because it is implied in the
agreement to arbitrate .... "); Ali Shipping Corp. v. Shipyard "Trogir," I Lloyd's Rep. 643 (A.C.
1998) (Eng.) (discussing the Dolling-Baker and Hassneh courts' holdings on the implied duty of
confidentiality created by arbitration agreements). For a contrary international decision that is
consistent with Contship Containerlines, see Esso Australia Resources, Ltd. v. Plowman, 128 A.L.R.
391 (S. Ct. Victoria 1995). For a discussion of these cases, see Alexis C. Brown, Presumption Meets
Reality: An Exploration of the Confidentiality Obligation in International Commercial Arbitration,
16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 969, 975-87 (2001).
75. Panhandle Eastern, 118 F.R.D. at 349-50.
76. No. Civ. A. 04-N-1228 (CBS, 04-X-0057), 2004 WL 1821968 (D. Colo. Aug. 13, 2004).
77. Id., at *1.
1267
HeinOnline  -- 54 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1267 2005-2006
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
accepted the agreement.7 8 However, the court said the defendant would
still have to establish "good cause" for a protective order under Federal
Rule 26(c) to preclude discovery of the evidence, thus preserving the
crucial distinction described above between disclosures to the general
public and disclosures in the context of formal legal proceedings. 79 The
court acknowledged some tension between the parties' confidentiality
agreement and the court's "obligation" to establish good cause to enter
the protective order, but ultimately decided that the documents sought to
be protected were already subject to disclosure pursuant to another
discovery order, thus avoiding a decision on the merits.
80
Similarly, in another unpublished decision, Urban Box Office
Network v. Interfase Managers,81 the Southern District of New York
looked beyond the confidentiality provision in an arbitration clause in
upholding the discovery of documents produced at an arbitration,
rejecting arguments in a later case that they were shielded by the
attorney-client privilege and by a confidentiality provision in the
arbitration clause.82 Like the Jaffee court, the Urban Box Office court
found that there was a valid confidentiality agreement in the arbitration
clause.84 However, it also found that the confidentiality agreement did
not trump the party's waiver of the attorney-client privilege with respect
to certain documents when it disclosed them at the prior arbitration.
Again, the demonstrated expectations of the parties were significant to
the court, which noted that the parties took no affirmative steps to invoke
the confidentiality provisions of the arbitration clause, such as stamping
the documents "confidential. 85 Like all of the other federal courts that
considered the question, the Urban Box Office court permitted the
discovery of the arbitration communications evidence.
86
The scant case law in the federal courts suggests the federal courts
may be unwilling to grant protective orders that prevent the introduction
of arbitration communications.87 This is consistent with longstanding
78. Id,
79. Id; see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (distinguishing disclosures to the general
public and in the context of formal legal proceedings).
80. Jaffee, 2004 WL 1821968, at *2.
81. No. 01 Civ. 8854 (LTS) (THK), 2004 WL 2375819 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2004).
82. Id. at *2-3.
83. 2004WL 1821968, at*1.
84. Urban Box Office, 2004 WL 2375819, at *5.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. For a general discussion of the reluctance of federal courts to recognize new privileges, and
the implications of that posture for mediation confidentiality, see Charles W. Ehrhardt,
Confidentiality, Privilege and Rule 408: The Protection of Mediation Proceedings in Federal Court,
60 LA. L. REv. 91 (1999).
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judicial policy favoring the admissibility of "every man's evidence.' 88
As we see below, state courts have been similarly reticent to provide
protections for arbitration communications, although with some variation
not yet seen in federal courts.
2. State Court Decisions
As with the federal context, there are few published state court
decisions about arbitration confidentiality--only two, one of which
upheld the discovery and admissibility of the arbitration
communications, the other of which did not.
The decision upholding admissibility, A.T. v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,89 was a Colorado Appeals Court decision that
was analytically similar to the federal cases described above.90 In that
case, the plaintiff, A.T., a self-employed chiropractor, claimed uninsured
motorist benefits from State Farm for injuries incurred in an automobile
accident. 91 The matter went to arbitration, where the plaintiff provided
medical records disclosing that she had been diagnosed with a
psychological disorder. 92 The plaintiff later testified as an expert medical
witness in unrelated litigation between one of her chiropractic patients
and State Farm, and the insurance company introduced evidence from
the arbitration of her psychological disorder during its cross-examination
of her.93 She sued State Farm for invasion of privacy and various harms
arising from their introduction of the psychological disorder evidence,
which she claimed was confidential to the arbitration.
94
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to admit the
evidence in the later case. As the federal courts had discussed earlier, the
appellate court looked to the expectations of the parties for guidance,
granting that there was no confidentiality provision in the arbitration
88. JOHN H. WIGMORE, 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2192 (1961); see also Doe v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983), cited in Domako v. Rowe, 475 N.W.2d 30, 36 (Mich. 1991)
("[N]o party to litigation has anything resembling a proprietary right to any witness's evidence.");
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 3 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 501.03[2] [a]
(Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2000) ("[T]here is a general duty to give testimony, because the public
has a right to everyone's evidence.").
89. 989 P.2d 219 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
90. See supra notes 65-86 and accompanying text.
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agreement95 and that there were no internal arbitration rules that would
have established the confidentiality of the proceedings. Rather, it found
that the arbitration was conducted under the state's version of the
Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), which permits arbitration awards to be
filed, challenged, and enforced in courts, and that the records relating to
such an arbitration are public records.96 Because the psychological
disorder records were potentially public and the plaintiff made no effort
to secure a protective order to preserve them as confidential
"proactively," the court held the records were public, discoverable, and
admissible.97
By contrast, the decision rejecting admissibility was by the Missouri
Court of Appeals in Group Health Plan, Inc. v. BJC Health Systems,
Inc., 98 an action by a hospital network against the sponsor of a managed
health care plan for breach of contract. 99 At the arbitration, the health
plan sponsor sought to introduce a transcript, exhibits, and the arbitration
award from one of its prior arbitrations that was subject to both an
express confidentiality provision and a protective order. °00 The hospital
network moved to quash in state court, arguing that the arbitration was
confidential under the state's arbitration law, which provides in relevant
part: "No admission, representation, statement or other confidential
communication made in setting up or conducting such proceedings not
otherwise discoverable or obtainable shall be admissible as evidence or
subject to discovery."''°  With the plain language of the state statute
clearly precluding the discovery and admissibility of the arbitration
communications, the court of appeals proceeded to rule that the sought-
after arbitration communications were not "otherwise discoverable"
under the Missouri statute because the parties had sought and received a
protective order from the arbitrator to secure their confidentiality.'0 2
Citing judicial policy favoring the use of arbitration, the court ruled that
the protective order should be viewed as an arbitration award entitled to
deference from the courts. 10 3 Because the documents were covered by
the protective order, they could not be "otherwise discoverable" under
95. Id. at 220-21.
96. Id.; see also Uniform Arbitration Act of 1975, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-201 (West
2004).
97. A. T., 989 P.2d at 220-21. Interestingly, the previously discussed cases suggest that the
plaintiff might have had a difficult time obtaining such a protective order.
98. 30 S.W.3d 198 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
99. Id. at 198.
100. Id. at200.
101. See id at 200-03 (citing Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435.014 (West 1992)).
102. Id. at 203.
103. 1d. at 204.
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the statute, and the arbitration documents were held not to be
discoverable. 104
With only two decisions on arbitration confidentiality, it is far too
early to discern any trend that might develop in the state courts. The
Missouri court's decision, especially its emphasis on judicial policy
favoring arbitration, provides some evidence that state courts may be
willing to shield arbitration communications from discovery and
admissibility, at least when there is clear statutory authority. As we have
seen, however, such authority is rare.
3. Summary of the Current State of the Doctrine
It is difficult to generalize from such a small handful of state and
federal cases. In assessing whether arbitration communications are
discoverable and admissible, the courts appear mindful of the tension
between the judicial system's need for relevant evidence, and the parties'
expectations of confidentiality. The judicial system's need for relevant
evidence generally has prevailed, especially when there is no
confidentiality clause in the agreement to arbitrate or other clear
evidence of the parties' expectation of confidentiality. Internal
arbitration rules may be a consideration in a court's determination, but
have not been persuasive evidence of the parties' expectations.
However, where there is evidence of party expectations, such as through
the securing of a protective order, courts may be more willing to defer to
the protective order if it otherwise meets relevant standards, such as the
good cause requirement in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). Where
statutory law clearly precludes the discovery and admissibility of
arbitration communications, such protective orders are likely to be
upheld. This sketch of the terrain only provides an initial impression of
what the emerging case law on this issue might look like. Many details
remain to be filled in by future cases.
D. Arbitrator Institutional and Ethical Rules
The rules of arbitration service providers and professional ethical
standards do not constitute positive law, but consistently call upon
arbitrators not to disclose arbitration communications, and therefore
104. Id. at 203-04.
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serves as a constraining force on disclosures of arbitration
communications.
However, this constraint is limited to disclosures by arbitrators to the
general public, and by their own terms these practice standards would not
preclude arbitrators from disclosing arbitration communications in
formal proceedings if so compelled by a duly constituted authority. For
example, the American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration
Rules require arbitrators to "maintain the privacy of the hearings unless
the law provides to the contrary."'10 5 Similarly, the arbitration rules of the
International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (CPR)
provide that "arbitrators and CPR shall treat the proceedings ... as
confidential ... unless otherwise required by law or to protect the legal
rights of a party."' 0 6  Finally, the oldest and arguably most significant
ethics rules for arbitrators also provide that "[a]ll significant aspects of
an arbitration proceeding must be treated by the arbitrator as confidential
unless this requirement is waived by both parties or disclosure is required
or permitted by law."' 0 7 Just as state and federal statutes and common
law generally do not preclude the discovery and admissibility of
arbitration communications evidence, it would appear that professional
ethical standards would not prohibit the discovery and admissibility of
testimony by the arbitrator with respect to arbitration communications.'°8
Rather, arbitral ethical rules and the rules of provider organizations thus
appear to respect the distinction between disclosures to the general public
and disclosures in formal proceedings, generally calling for arbitrators to
maintain confidentiality with respect to the former, but to comply with
legal requirements with respect to formal proceedings.
105. AM. ARB. ASS'N, COM. ARB. R. & MEDIATION PROC. R. 23 (amended 2005), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440#R23.
106. INT'L INST. CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOL., RULES FOR NON-ADMINISTERED ARB. R. 17
(amended 2005), available at http://www.cpradr.org/pdfs/arb-rules2005.pdf.
107. CODE PROF. RESP. ARB. LAB.-MGMT. DIsP. NAT'L ACAD. ARB., AM. ARB. ASS'N, FED.
MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV., STD. 2(C) (amended 2003), available at
http://www.naarb.org/code.html. Interestingly, the relatively new American Bar Association Code
of Conduct for Commercial Arbitrators does not provide such excusing language, stating simply
"[t]he arbitrator should keep confidential all matters relating to the arbitration proceedings and
decision." A.B.A. CODE ETHICS COM. ARB., CANON VI(B) (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/commercial disputes.pdf.
108. While it is plausible to argue that the "permitted by law" references in these rules refer only
to substantive law and not procedural law, it is unlikely that courts would reach such a conclusion
because of the heavy presumption in favor of the admissibility of relevant evidence.
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E. Summary of the Law of the Discovery and Admissibility of
Arbitration Communications
Contract law may be used to enforce agreements between private
parties, including the arbitrator, not to disclose arbitration
communications to third parties generally. However, at both the state
and the federal level, present law provides little reliable support for
arbitration confidentiality when arbitration communications are sought
for purposes of discovery or admission at trial. Federal statutory law
provides some protections for arbitrations involving administrative
agencies, but that is relatively inconsequential since arbitration is rarely
used by federal agencies. To date, federal courts have been reluctant to
grant orders protecting arbitration communications under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(c), and have rejected arguments that non-disclosure
may be compelled by implication of law, internal arbitration rules, and
the parties' general understanding that arbitration proceedings are
confidential.
The overwhelming majority of states do not have statutes or court
rules that generally preclude the admission of arbitration
communications in formal legal proceedings, although some have
statutes or rules that would bar the discovery or admissibility of
arbitration communications for certain arbitrations, such as attorney-fee
arbitration. The two state cases on this point are mixed, with one
appellate court essentially tracking the federal courts, and one going the
other way in permitting the introduction of arbitration communications.
Significantly, the case upholding confidentiality, BJC Health Systems,
was exceptional in that it was from one of only four states that has a
statute specifically excepting arbitration communications from discovery
or admissibility, and involved parties who had received a protective
order from a trial court to preserve the confidentiality of proprietary
commercial information.
Assuming BJC Health Systems is anomalous, the trend within the
courts is nascent but coalescing: Absent specific legislative guidance,
courts appear reluctant to preclude the discovery or admissibility of
arbitration communications. In the next section, I explore the question of
whether such a result is problematic.
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III. SHOULD ARBITRATION COMMUNICATIONS EVIDENCE BE SUBJECT
TO DISCOVERY AND ADMISSIBILITY?
The normative question of whether arbitration communications
evidence should be discoverable and admissible is complex, raising
fundamental questions about the relationship between arbitration and the
law. More precisely, it reveals the tension between the process needs of
trial and arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, as well as the
expectations of the parties in these processes. These tensions may be
resolved by reference to the key characteristics of trial and arbitration
respecting confidentiality, the history, structure, and doctrine of the
FAA, as well as pragmatic and democratic considerations. Assessment of
these factors suggests that at least some limitation on the discoverability
and admissibility of arbitration communications is appropriate.
A. Key Characteristics of the Trial and Arbitration Respecting
Confidentiality
Trial and arbitration, often perceived as public and private
adjudication respectively, are similar in that both are processes in which
a third-party adjudicator decides how a dispute will be resolved.10 9 This
stands in strong contrast to consensual processes, such as interest-based
negotiation or mediation, in which the parties seek a resolution of their
dispute that will mutually satisfy their needs, interests, and concerns." 10
Trial and arbitration are also adversarial processes, meaning that the
parties are competing against each other for a favorable decision by the
third-party adjudicators."' Adversarial processes typically share certain
characteristics, most notably the strategic management of information
and distributive (win-lose) rather than integrative (win-win) outcomes. 1 2
Parties in an adversarial proceeding generally seek to discover as much
as they can about the other side's case while disclosing little about their
own case." 3 They also use a wide variety of tactics to further this
109. See RISKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 14-15.
110. See generally ROBERT J. MNOOKIN, SCOTT PEPPET & ANDREW TULUMELLO, BEYOND
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000); ROGER FISHER,
WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING
IN (2nd ed. 1991); Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984).
111. See generally Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (2002);
Herbert M. Kritzer, American Adversarialism, 38 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 349 (2004) (reviewing
Kagan's book).
112. See RISKIN ET AL., supra note I at 165-67 (discussing the adversarial approach to
negotiation).
113. For an example of this in the negotiation context, see Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory
of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L. J. 1789, 1792-94 (2000).
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adversarial approach, such as framing their positions in the most positive
light, if not affirmatively misleading others about their cases.' 14  Such
tactics are often seen as necessary in adversarial processes because of the
distributive nature of the outcome. In a purely adversarial process,'15
integrative results generally are not possible. The decisionmaker must
decide which party wins and which party loses.
Arbitration and trial differ, however, in two important respects that
have important implications for the confidentiality of arbitration
communications evidence: the level of formality of the process and the
public/private character of the process.
1. Level of Formality
A pervasive process characteristic of trial is its formality. From the
initial discovery into the facts of a dispute to the final confirmation of an
adjudicated decision by a reviewing court, the trial process is closely
tethered to formal rules of procedural and substantive law. A crucial
function of the judge presiding over the process is to assure adherence to
such rules. In the main, these rules are intended to provide decisional
norms, societally determined through democratic processes," 6 as well as
procedural safeguards to assure fairness to the parties as the court fulfills
its truth-seeking function by overseeing the introduction of evidence and
arguments in the adversarial process. In some important respects, this
function lies at the heart of the rule of law."
17
Arbitration, by contrast, is an informal process that does not rely
upon formal rules of law and procedure as these decisional standards are
not necessarily applied, absent the agreement of the parties. Moreover,
the awards of the arbitrators are generally final and binding without
114. For an argument that attorneys should lie if necessary to advance the interests of their
clients, see James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar. Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 926, 927-29. In arbitration, parties may be more cooperative with
discovery requests because of the broad nature of discovery in arbitration. See HILL & SINICROPI,
supra note 22, at 95-99.
115. Not all adversarial processes are purely adversarial because they often include elements of
other dispute resolution processes. For example, negotiation is such an important part of the trial, or
"litigation," process that some have said the process is better understood as "litigotiation." Marc
Galanter, World of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268,
268 (1984).
116. These democratic processes include both legislation, administrative rules, and to a lesser
extent, judicial rules.
117. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 34 (2004)
(discussing, inter alia, the meaning of "legal liberty" as requiring a democratic government to act
according to preexisting standards, applied through the principle of equality).
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judicial review for correctness." 18 This informality is attractive to some
because of its potential to lead to a faster and cheaper adjudication than
public trial." 9 While discovery is available, 120 it is not used as much as in
public adjudication.121 Motion practice also is not as common as in
public adjudication, and the lack of substantive judicial review
discourages costly and time-consuming appeals.' 
22
Even though it is informal, the arbitration process has certain needs
to operate effectively, efficiently, and legitimately in the sense that it is
consistent with principles of procedural justice 23  and democratic
values. 124 The real and perceived impartiality of the arbitrator is widely
recognized as a core value of the process. 125 Moreover, the absence of
constraints on decisionmaking, other than those that might be imposed
by the parties themselves, is vital to the arbitration process. Arbitral
decisionmaking calls upon the flexibility of worldly judgment, fortified
by specialized knowledge, substantive expertise, and experience, rather
than on the application of formal legal standards that is the duty of trial
courts. 126 It is for this reason that rules of evidence and procedure
generally do not apply in arbitration,' 27 and that arbitrators instead
consider such factors as industry customs and practices, hearsay, and
other evidence that may be excluded at trial. The extremely limited
nature of judicial review of arbitral awards is an important support for
118. See I GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §§ 33:1-6, 34:1-2 (3d ed. 2005) (detailing current
substantive and procedural requirements of commercial arbitration).
119. For a general discussion of advantages of informality in arbitration, see RISKIN ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 653.
120. See 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1999 and Supp. 2003) ("Witnesses Before Arbitrators; Fees; Compelling
Attendance"); UNF. ARBITRATION ACT §5, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1997) ("Hearing"); UNIF. ARBITRATION
ACT § 17, 7 U.L.A. 1 (rev. 2001) ("Witnesses; Subpoenaes; Deposition; Discovery").
121. For a discussion and comparison of discovery in arbitration and trial, see Stephen Hayford
and Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10
OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 343, 367-76 (1995). For a connection of this literature to democratic
theory, see Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution. The Problem of Arbitration, 67
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279 (2004) [hereinafter Reuben, Democracy].
122. See generally RISKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 653.
123. For an exhaustive compilation of the procedural justice literature by one of the architects of
the scholarly movement, see TOM R. TYLER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (2005). For a concise summary,
see Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do With
It, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 817-26 (2001).
124. See Reuben, Democracy, supra note 121, at 285-93 (2004) (discussing democracy in terms
of political, legal, and social capital values).
125. See Richard C. Reuben, Impartiality in Arbitration: Accounting for Arbitrator Self-Interest,
4 J. AM. ARB. 293, 294-304 (discussing impartiality as core arbitration value and problems in
defining impartiality).
126. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38 (1987)
(discussing the role of arbitration in collective-bargaining agreements); United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (discussing the need for flexibility on the
part of arbitrators).
127. See RISKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 510-16 (discussing characteristics of arbitration).
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the flexibility and informality of judgment that lies at the core of the
arbitration process.
2. Public/Private Character
Trial is often called public adjudication because of its public
character-that is to say, it is a dispute resolution process that takes place
largely in the full view of the public. It also applies publicly derived
standards as the basis for decisionmaking.
To be sure, there are many virtues that derive from the public
character of trial, although three are worth emphasizing. The public
character of trial requires disputes to be resolved by standards that have
been promulgated pursuant to a democratic process rather than by the
caprice of the decision-maker, which fosters such democratic values as
equality and due process. 128 The availability of public witness provides
accountability for the judicial process-a crucial public participation
function-and helps assure its rationality. Finally, the public character of
trial plays an important role in legitimizing the work of the courts in a
democratic society. 129  Accountability, rationality, transparency, public
participation and the fulfillment of other democratic values in the
resolution of disputes inspires confidence in the courts as a democratic
institution, as well as acceptance of, and compliance with, 3° judicial
decisions by the general public.'
3
'
Arbitration, on the other hand, is a private process. As noted above,
the procedure is generally conducted in private using decisional
standards other than those provided by public law. The parties also have
the power to determine whether and which outsiders may have access to
arbitration hearings and awards. 132 This can be particularly important to
parties who are concerned about competitive or other disadvantages if
128. See Reuben, Democracy, supra note 121, at 290-91.
129. For further discussion of the role of courts in democratic governance, see id. at 293-95.
130. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (using empirical studies
to argue that people obey the law when it is legitimate in that it complies with tested indicia of
procedural justice); Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the Law: A Political Perspective, 66 U. CIN. L.
REV. 847, 866-70 (1998) (using empirical data to demonstrate that the most important factor in
people's compliance with legal procedures is their trust in legal authorities).
131. I have argued elsewhere that as a dispute resolution process that is supported by the
government, arbitration should operate in a way that furthers democratic values rather than
undermining them. See Reuben, Democracy, supra note 121, at 295-318.
132. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the capacity of parties
to contract for the confidentiality of arbitration communications as to third parties generally, see
Schmitz, supra note 15.
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information about, or arising from, the arbitration is made public. 133
While there does not appear to be empirical data on the point, experience
suggests that privacy is one of the more important process values for
those who choose to use arbitration to resolve disputes. 1
34
3. Implications for Confidentiality of Arbitration Communications
The foregoing discussion of the formal and public characters of trial
and arbitration seems to counsel against limitations on the availability of
arbitration communications evidence, and in favor of general
discoverability and admissibility.
For trial, a fundamental principle of evidence law is the right of all
parties to relevant evidence to establish their cases,' 35 thus facilitating the
truth-seeking function of courts. 13 6 The Supreme Court has consistently
upheld this right to "every man's evidence,"' 137 as well as the corollary
principle that privileges and exceptions to the right to "every man's
evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in
derogation of the search for truth.' 138  Under this view, permitting the
discovery and admissibility of arbitration communications at trial would
encourage consistent and truthful party testimony, arguments, and other
communications at both arbitration and trial, thus fostering the normative
goals of candor and truth telling in arbitration and public adjudication.
Similarly, arbitration welcomes as much information as it can get to
inform the worldly judgment of arbitrators. Discovery and admissibility
of arbitration communications would foster truthfulness in arbitration,
and also help prevent the abuse of arbitration for normatively undesirable
reasons, such as the shielding of helpful or necessary evidence and the
133. See RISKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 654.
134. Id.
135. See FED. R. EVID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided
by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is
not admissible.").
136. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 1-3 (3d ed. 2003) (explaining the purpose of the
Rules of Evidence).
137. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2192, at 71 (John T. McNaughton
ed., 1961) (citing 12 PARL. HIST. ENG. (1742) 643, 693) (citing Lord Chancellor Hardwicke's
famous statement during a 1792 Parliamentary debate, "[T]he public has a right to every man's
evidence, a maxim which in its proper sense cannot be denied."). This maxim has also long been
present in the American legal system: "It is ... beyond controversy that one of the duties which the
citizen owes to his government is to support the administration of justice by attending its courts and
giving his testimony whenever he is properly summoned." Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,
438 (1932).
138. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
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exploitation of power imbalances between the parties. 139 Finally, as I
will briefly suggest below, the availability of arbitration communications
may be especially important when the government is involved as a party
in the arbitration, to monitor the effective exercise of democratic
governance. 
14 0
It can be argued that the arbitration process can function quite well
without relief from discovery and admissibility for arbitration
communications. While it is an informal process, arbitration remains an
adversarial process, and as discussed above, the parties can be expected
to guard sensitive information zealously. This caution may seem
counter-intuitive to some who might expect arbitration to be a kinder and
gentler process precisely because it is an alternative dispute resolution
process. Arbitration's lack of formality can make it kinder and gentler
than public adjudication. But it still differs greatly from mediation, the
most significant of the other alternative dispute resolution processes, in a
way that is significant for the treatment of confidentiality in each of these
processes. While both include a role for a third party, the function that
third party performs is dramatically different. In arbitration, the third
party decides the dispute. In mediation, however, the third party neutral
merely facilitates the parties' own resolution of their dispute. While
models for achieving this facilitation vary widely,14 1 party autonomy and
self-determination in deciding the outcome are the central distinguishing
characteristics of mediation. 142 In other words, the structure of mediation
is consensual, not adversarial, as it is in arbitration.
The implications of this structural distinction are significant for
purposes of considering the process needs of arbitration with respect to
confidentiality. In arbitration, the arbitrator merely presides over the
adversarial process before making a decision about which party will
prevail based upon the positions they argue and the evidence they present
to support those positions. In mediation, however, one important role of
the mediator is to help parties get beyond their narrowly stated positions
139. For an important discussion of power imbalances in the ADR context, see Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073, 1076-78 (1984).
140. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
141. For a seminal discussion of the various mediation styles, see generally Leonard L. Riskin,
Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, I
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996). For a critique, see generally Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative
versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985
(1997).
142. See RISKIN ET AL., supra note 1 at 338-39; Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators I
("Self-Determination") (amended 2005).
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to consider the broader underlying interests that drive those positions. 143
This frequently includes convincing, or cajoling, parties to disclose their
needs, interests, and concerns. Styles for doing this vary, but some
approaches can be quite coercive in wrenching information from
potentially reluctant parties. 1
44
Put another way, part of the mediator's job is to get the parties to
disclose information that they probably would not disclose in an
adversarial process. In this circumstance, it is appropriate for the law to
protect the confidentiality of mediation, including prohibitions on the use
of mediation communications in formal legal proceedings such as those
found in the privileges conferred by the Uniform Mediation Act and state
mediation confidentiality acts. 145 Much of that which parties disclose in
the mediation may not be disclosed but for the efforts of the mediator.
Since society has a strong interest in the resolution of disputes in general,
and in mediation in particular, 146 and since the mediation process itself
could not function without the assurance of the parties that their
mediation communications will not be used against them in court should
the mediation fail, it is sensible and appropriate for the law to provide
this assurance through the protections of formal law.
As a process, however, arbitration does not require this protection of
formal law. Because the process is adversarial in nature, parties already
safeguard sensitive evidence, and while the arbitrator, like a judge, is
permitted to ask questions and make inquiry, the scope of that inquiry is
generally narrower than in mediation. 147 The arbitrator in such
circumstances is generally seeking clarification of the facts or the parties'
positions and the evidence that supports them, rather than seeking to
ascertain the needs, interests, and concerns that lie beneath those
positions. For that reason, as a process matter, arbitration, like trial, does
not need the confidentiality that mediation requires.
143. The emphasis on interests in mediation theory is not always bom out in practice. In fact,
many mediations reflect compromises between positions rather than a true integration of the parties'
interests, needs, and concerns. Such a dynamic may be explained by a number of factors, including
party capacity, mediator style, and the time available for mediation. Such an inquiry, however, is
beyond the scope of this paper.
144. See James Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of "'Good
Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 66-73 (1991) (exploring "trashing," "bashing," and
"hashing" strategies used in court-connected mediations in Florida).
145. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4 (amended 2003), 7A U.L.A. 104, 122 (supp. 2005)
(conferring privileges in the context of mediation).
146. Id. at 105 (discussing the growth and benefits of mediation).
147. FRANK ELKHOURI & EDNA ELKHOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 317-18 (ALAN MILES
RUBIN ed., 6th ed. 2003).
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B. Justifying a Rule of Exclusion
The foregoing discussion suggests that confidentiality is not an
essential characteristic of arbitration in that a rule of evidentiary
exclusion is not necessary to the functioning of arbitration as an
adversarial process. Therefore, a rule of evidentiary exclusion is only
justified if compelled by other considerations. In my view, the private
character of arbitration provides this justification. Simply put, the
promise of a dispute resolution process that operates apart from, but is
supported by, the public system of law would prove illusory if
communications made in that process were readily subject to discovery
and admissibility in other formal proceedings. Once introduced, such
documents would become public records, readily available to those
seeking them unless properly sealed. In this section, I demonstrate how
the history, structure, and doctrine of the Federal Arbitration Act support
this view. In enacting the FAA, Congress intended to authorize a private
adjudicatory alternative to public trial. 48  A general rule freely
permitting the discovery and admissibility of arbitration communications
would frustrate this unambiguous congressional intent, upset party
expectations of arbitration, create pragmatic problems, undermine public
confidence in the arbitration process, and inhibit the democratic
legitimacy of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution process.
1. Historical Considerations
Western courts for centuries were reluctant to enforce agreements to
arbitrate, on the theory that such agreements improperly ousted the
courts of their right and obligation to apply the law of the sovereign to
disputes arising within the jurisdiction of the sovereign. 149 While courts
were willing to enforce arbitration awards, they historically had refused
to enforce the initial agreements to arbitrate. Under the so-called "ouster
doctrine" English courts, and later American courts, regularly found such
agreements to arbitrate to be void. Courts generally took the view that
disputes needed to be resolved according to public law, ostensibly
148. For an argument that arbitration under the FAA is public for purposes of constitutional due
process, see Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 20.
149. See Reuben, Public Justice, supra note 23, at 594-605 (discussing the historical
relationship between contractual ADR and the courts).
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because of the public virtues noted above.' 50 They were reluctant to
endorse a process that impeded public dispute resolution, and that
hesitance was reflected in a general refusal to enforce agreements to
arbitrate.
The FAA and related state statutes were the result of a coordinated
effort by the commercial community and the legal profession at the turn
of the nineteenth century to reverse the ouster doctrine legislatively and
to permit the specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate commercial
cases. 151 In so doing, Congress explicitly and effectively provided
disputants with a reliable way of opting out of the public system of law
while still retaining the ability to have an adjudicated judgment that is
legally enforceable by public courts. Indeed, this was the purpose of the
Act, 152 and permitting the discovery and admissibility of arbitration
communications evidence would frustrate this unambiguous
congressional intent.
2. Structural Considerations
This purpose is reflected in the structure of the Federal Arbitration
Act. Section 2 is the heart of the Act, and articulates a contractual
approach to arbitration that the courts have implemented faithfully. It
provides that arbitration agreements will be enforced just like any other
contractual agreement, as long as the agreement is enforceable as a
matter of contract law. 153 Section 4 of the Act further permits a court to
compel an unwilling party into arbitration if it is satisfied that there is an
enforceable agreement to arbitrate, 54 and Section 3 permits it to stay
related legal proceedings so the dispute may be arbitrated. 55  At that
point, the Act contemplates that the dispute will be resolved by an
arbitrator acting outside the sphere of public law, with Section 7
150. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
151. See. Reuben, Public Justice, supra note 23, at 601; see JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE
WITHOUT LAW? 136 (1983). For a definitive history of the FAA, see IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992).
152. RISKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 516.
153. Section 2 states that "A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2.
154. Section 4 states: ". . .The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the
making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court
shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement." Id. § 4.
155. Section 3 states: "... the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the
issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on
application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in
accordance with the terms of the agreement..."Id. § 3.
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authorizing the arbitrator to summon and hear witnesses during the
arbitration,15 6 and Sections 9 and 13 permitting the arbitrator to issue an
award that may be entered as a court judgment. 157
Significantly, the Federal Arbitration Act is predicated upon a
contract model of structuring human relationships that emphasizes
private ordering over public ordering. Arbitration is often called a
"creature of contract,"'158 and a central goal of contract law is to reinforce
the reasonable expectations of the parties. 159 As noted above, privacy or
confidentiality is often a consideration in the disputants' choice of
arbitration as a dispute resolution option. 16  Indeed, arbitration is often
held out to consumers as a private alternative to trial, creating a
reasonable expectation on the part of the consumer that the process is
confidential. This expectation is acknowledged by all of the major
protocols that have been adopted by the arbitration community as a part
of its industry self-regulation. The Employment Due Process Protocol
states that the protocol is offered to encourage "expeditious, accessible,
inexpensive, and fair private enforcement of statutory employment
disputes.'' The Consumer Due Process Protocol specifically
156. Id. §7.
157. Section 9 states: "If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court
shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at
any time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court
so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order
unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title..
• ." Id. § 9. Section 13 states in relevant part that "The judgment shall be docketed as if it was
rendered in an action... Id. § 13.
158. See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) ("[A]rbitration
is simply a matter of contract between the parties ...."); Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore
Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 78 (1999); Alan Scott Rau,
Everything You Really Need to Know about "'Separability" in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14
AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1, 62 (2003); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules:
Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 709 n. 17 (1999) (noting that "A search
on July 10, 1998, for the phrase 'arbitration is a creature of contract' in the Westlaw ALLCASES
database yielded 177 cases.").
159. See I JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1, at 2 (1993) (The heading of this
section explains that "The main purpose of contract law is the realization of reasonable expectations
induced by promises."); E. Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J.
939, 951 (1967) ("The object of contract law is to protect the justifiable expectations of the
contracting parties ...."); see also Catherine Mitchell, Leading a Life of its Own? The Roles of
Reasonable Expectation in Contract Law, 23 OXFORD J. LEG. STUDIES 639 (2003) (examining the
varied understanding of the roles of the reasonable expectation in contract law); W. David Slawson,
The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U.
PITT. L. REV. 21 (1984) (explaining how the use of standard form contracts relates to, and can be
used to further, the reasonable expectations of the parties).
160. See supra note I and sources cited therein.
161. DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR THE MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY
DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, GENESIS (May 5, 1995) (emphasis
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acknowledges this expectation by stating that "[clonsistent with general
expectations of privacy in arbitration hearings, the arbitrator should
make reasonable efforts to maintain the privacy of the hearing to the
extent permitted by applicable law." 161 Similarly, in describing the
principle of a "fair hearing" the Health Care Due Process Protocol states:
"The hearing and determination through mediation or arbitration should
be private and confidential, unless the parties agree otherwise."'
163
All of these protocols were signed by a wide array of arbitration
constituents, including sections of the American Bar Association, major
arbitration professional associations and service providers, plaintiffs' and
defense lawyers' associations, and consumer groups, among others.
64
While they may not carry the force of law or provide sanctions for their
breach, an important critique of these documents, 65 these protocols at the
least help establish the reasonableness of party expectations of the
confidentiality of arbitration communications. Judicial policy respecting
the confidentiality of arbitration communications should reinforce rather
than frustrate these reasonable party expectations by allowing for such
communications to become court records that may be freely
disseminated to the public absent a valid protective order.
3. Doctrinal Considerations
Reflecting the foregoing considerations, the federal and state courts,
led by the U.S. Supreme Court, have held that the FAA establishes a
strong national policy favoring the use of arbitration to resolve
disputes.166 In a series of decisions in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
added), available at http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/special/protocol.pdf (last visited Nov.
28, 2006).
162. NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N,
CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL: A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND
ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER DISPUTES (1998) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.aspid=22019.
163. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION/AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION/AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON HEALTH CARE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, FINAL REPORT,
PRINCIPLE 7(1) (July 27, 1998), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28633.
164. Signatories for each of these protocols can be found on the protocols.
165. See Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 369, 434-45 (2004).
166. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-28
(1985) (reiterating the policy); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983) (establishing the policy); see also Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc.,
776 F.2d 269, 270 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("In light of the federal policy favoring arbitration at work here,
our task is to resolve all doubt in favor of the arbitrator's authority to award a particular remedy.").
For a critique of the expansiveness with which this policy has been interpreted by some courts and
scholars, see Reuben, Public Justice, supra note 23, and Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate
Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637
640 n. 18 (1996); see also Margaret M. Harding, The Clash Between Federal and State Arbitration
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Court formally overruled the "ouster doctrine,"'' 67  which had long
survived its legislative reversal in the FAA. 168  In a stark reversal of
policy, the Court has come to strongly support arbitration, even when
statutory rights are at stake, 169 interpreting the FAA to reflect a strong
national policy favoring the arbitration of disputes.'
70
To be sure, as a doctrinal matter, the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration developed in the context of the narrower issue of whether a
given issue or dispute is "arbitrable," or subject to an arbitration
clause. 17 ' But the Supreme Court has given this policy determination
further reach than just arbitrability, including as a justification for broad
federal preemption of state law on arbitration issues1 72 and the unique
establishment of a federal substantive law of arbitration. 173  Although
Law and the Appropriateness of Arbitration as a Dispute Resolution Process, 77 NEB. L. REV. 397,
455-60 (1998) ("One can only speculate as to where the Court found the strong federal policy
favoring arbitration.")
167. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (overruling
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), an important symbol of the ouster doctrine in American law).
168. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953) (right to select judicial forum not the kind of right
that can be waived under Securities Act of 1934).
169. E.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). This movement by the
Court has been controversial. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 166; Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of
Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB.
L.J. 1 (1996) (urging narrower construction of Gilmer).
170. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (holding
that the Arbitration Act establishes a "federal policy favoring arbitration"); see also
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) ("The Federal Arbitration
Act thus establishes a 'federal policy favoring arbitration,' requiring that we vigorously enforce
agreements to arbitrate." (citations omitted)). But see Sternlight, supra note 166, at 641 ("Congress
did not intend to enforce arbitration agreements that had been foisted on ignorant consumers, and it
did not intend to prevent states from protecting weaker parties.").
171. For a discussion of the breadth of the term "arbitrable," see Richard C. Reuben, First
Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for
Contract with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REv. 819, 832-34 (2003) [hereinafter Reuben,
First Options].
172. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 S.Ct, 1204 (2006) (ruling that FAA
preempts state usury law for purposes of determining validity of arbitration provision in a contract
alleged to be void ab initio); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 116 (1984) (holding FAA
preempts state laws restricting arbitrability). For a critique, see David S. Schwartz, Correcting
Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration
Act, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (2004). For a defense, see Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal
Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393 (2004).
173. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25 (Section 2 of the FAA "create[s] a body of federal
substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the
Act .. " For scholarly commentary see Kenneth F. Dunham, Sailing Around Erie: The Emergence
of a Federal Common Law ofArbitration, 6 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 197 (2006); Stephen Hayford,
Federal Preemption and Vacatur: The Bookend Issues under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act,
2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 67, 69; G. Richard Shell, Federal Versus State Law in the Interpretation of
Contracts Containing Arbitration Clauses: Reflections on Mastrobuono, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 43, 50-
51 (1996).
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they have not been nearly as robust in their enthusiasm, many state
courts have also embraced arbitration as a substitute for litigation by
deciding cases presented to them with an eye toward the strong national
policy favoring arbitration. 174
The free discovery and admissibility of arbitration communications
evidence can reasonably be expected to have a chilling effect on the
willingness of parties to use arbitration, and therefore would frustrate this
strong national policy favoring the arbitration of disputes.
4. Democratic Considerations
Arbitration under the FAA has a strong democratic character that
provides an important subtext of the foregoing discussion. Personal
autonomy is an overriding value of democratic governance, and in the
dispute resolution context this is manifest in the availability of, and
governmental support for, many options for resolving disputes, ranging
from avoidance to informal consensual methods such as negotiation to
the formality of public adjudication.' 75  Put another way, under U.S.
democracy, an aggrieved party may seek to publicly adjudicate a dispute,
but one is not required to do So.176 As noted above, Congress intended
private arbitration to be one of those process choices. The legislative
history of the FAA is sparse, but still reflects several reasons for this
endorsement, including judicial efficiency and party preference for the
speedier resolution of disputes. 177 These are ample reasons for choosing
arbitration, and maintaining the integrity of the arbitration process by
reaffirming party expectations of confidentiality would support
autonomy and choice in dispute resolution.
5. Synthesis
The foregoing discussion of historical, structural, doctrinal, and
democratic considerations of arbitration under the FAA all seem to
174. See, e.g., Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 902-04 (Cal. 1992); Hojnowski v.
Vans Skate Park, 901 A.2d 381, 392 (N.J. 2006); Zuver v. Airtouch Communications, Inc., 103 P.3d
753, 758-59 (Wash. 2004); Pittsburgh Joint Collective Bargaining Comm. v. City of Pittsburgh, 391
A.2d 1318, 1322 (Pa. 1978). But see Casarroto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1994) (rev'd in
Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996)); Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc., 894 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 2005); Reuben, First Options, supra note 171, at 852-55 (describing how
states have limited federal- doctrine of separability, which is predicated on strong federal policy
favoring arbitration).
175. See RISKIN ET AL., supra note I at 12-18; DEAN G. PRUITT & SUNG HEE KIM, SOCIAL
CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND SETTLEMENT 189-258 (3rd ed. 2004).
176. Defendants in civil cases are often brought into the legal process against their preference.
177. S. REp. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (statement of Mr. Sterling, Senate Committee on the
Judiciary).
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counsel in favor of some constraint on the discoverability and
admissibility of arbitration communications made under the Act.
Historically, the purpose of the Act is to assure a private adjudicatory
alternative to public adjudication, and once arbitration communications
are disclosed in formal legal proceedings, they become public records,
and therefore may be widely disseminated, despite the presence of an
arbitration confidentiality provision barring disclosure to such
communications. The private alternative to public adjudication is
effectively lost because the proverbial cat is out of the bag.
Structurally, the Act is premised on the foundation of contract law.
Barring arbitration communications from discovery and admissibility
would reinforce the parties' reasonable and widely recognized
expectations with respect to the confidentiality of arbitration. In so
doing, it would also strengthen arbitration's connection to contract law
more generally, 178 thus leading to decisions by courts that would be more
internally consistent and that would provide greater reliability for parties.
To the extent that state and federal cases discussed in Part II have
obliquely referenced contractual agreements for the confidentiality of the
arbitration, one suspects that it was the influence of this rationale,
especially since party agreements to withhold evidence from courts
would be void as a matter of public policy.
Doctrinally, the U.S. Supreme Court and the lower courts have
recognized that the FAA represents a strong national policy favoring the
use of arbitration as a dispute resolution process. This policy has
significant implications for arbitration confidentiality. The free
discovery and admissibility of arbitration communications can
reasonably be expected to have a chilling effect on the willingness of
parties to use arbitration, thereby frustrating the strong federal policy
favoring the arbitration of disputes. Simply put, parties may be reluctant
to use arbitration if they know that it is not confidential, if they know that
their communications in arbitration can be discovered and admitted into
evidence in other legal proceedings. 79 One can forcefully argue that if
there is any place that a party may not wish to see an arbitration
communication, it is in formal legal proceedings, where such
communications can have arguably the most prejudice because of their
impact on formal legal rights.
178. For a strong view favoring broad grounding of arbitration in contract law, see Stephen J.
Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to
Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195 (1998).
179. Empirical research on this assumption would be helpful.
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Finally, these considerations are all fortified by the practical realities
of the situation. A general rule permitting discovery of arbitration
communications would have the deleterious effect of distorting the
arbitration process and undermining other arbitration process
characteristics. Rather than being a private alternative to public
adjudication, arbitration under the FAA could become an important
source for private information for public use. Well-funded litigants
could use arbitrations for fishing expeditions, seeking documents that
could be helpful in other litigation.18 0  Complying with discovery
requests would impose a potentially enormous administrative burden on
arbitrators, parties, and providers of arbitration services. It would also
subvert the arbitration process goal of efficiency by slowing down the
arbitration process if such discovery would be sought during a pending
arbitration, and undermine the parties' confidence in the process more
generally.
All of these reasons counsel in favor of some constraint on the
admissibility of arbitration communication evidence. In the next
Subsection, I explore the nature of appropriate limitations in this context
in greater detail.
C. Structuring a Rule of Exclusion
Experience with other forms of alternative dispute resolution teach
that one must carefully tailor an evidentiary exclusion to the unique
requirements of the ADR process. In this section, I look at the primary
techniques used in two other major ADR processes-negotiation and
mediation-and demonstrate why they are unsuitable for arbitration. I
then propose that elevating the burden of proof to require a showing of
unavailability and necessity when evidence is sought from an arbitration
proceeding provides the right balance between the confidentiality needs
of arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act and the evidentiary needs
of the public system of law.
1. Negotiation: The Settlement Discussion Doctrine
Negotiation communications are protected in two ways. The first is
by allowing negotiating parties to agree not to disclose statements made
during the negotiation to the general public, such as to friends, spouses,
business associates, or others who might have an interest in learning
180. The State Farm case, discussed supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text, was just such a
case.
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about what was said in the negotiation. As we have seen, courts
routinely uphold such private agreements.' 81
The second way the law protects the confidentiality of legal
negotiations is through the regulation of their admissibility in judicial
proceedings. The doctrine regarding settlement discussions or offers of
compromise on legal claims generally prohibits statements made in
settlement discussions from being introduced in a later trial or other legal
proceeding to establish the validity or amount of a legal claim. The
purpose of the rule is generally to promote settlement by encouraging the
parties to be candid during settlement discussions by rendering
information exchanged during the settlement discussion inadmissible in
subsequent proceedings. The rule is of common law origin, but has been
codified by many states, and at the federal level by Rule 408 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or
(2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a
claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not
require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable
merely because it is presented in the course of compromise
negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion when the
evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or
prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or
proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or
prosecution.
Significantly, the reasoning behind the settlement discussions
doctrine is consistent with the establishment of greater protection for
arbitration confidentiality in that it recognizes the judicial policy
favoring the resolution of disputes by means other than public
adjudication. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit relied on this settlement
discussion rationale in holding that the media did not have a First
Amendment right to cover a summary jury trial in Cincinnati Gas &
181. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Electric Co. v. General Electric Co. 182 The court noted that "[s]ettlement
techniques have historically been closed to the press and public," and
found that a summary jury trial is more like a settlement than a "real
trial":
In a summary jury proceeding, attorneys present abbreviated
arguments to jurors who render an informal verdict that guides
the settlement of the case .... [A]I1 evidence is presented in the
form of a descriptive summary to the mock jury through the
parties' attorneys. Live witnesses do not testify, and evidentiary
objections are discouraged .... Following counsels'
presentations, the jury is given an abbreviated charge and then
retires to deliberate. The jury then returns a "verdict." To
emphasize the purely settlement function of the exercise, the
mock jury is often asked to assess damages even if it finds no
liability. Also, the court and jurors join the attorneys and parties
after the "verdict" is returned in an informal discussion of the
strengths and weaknesses of each side's case. At every turn, the
summary jury trial is designed to facilitate pretrial settlement of
the litigation, much like a settlement conference.'
83
However, as an alternative method of dispute resolution, arbitration
much more resembles a "real trial" than a settlement discussion, making
this structure inappropriate for a general protection of arbitration
confidentiality. Generally acting through attorneys, the parties present
evidence, witnesses, and arguments to a third-party decision maker who
renders a decision that is generally binding upon the parties, even if there
are mistakes of law. 8 4 Parties in an arbitration generally are not seeking
to reconcile their differences, nor are they exploring their underlying
interests and concerns to find an integrated solution to their dispute.
Rather, in arbitration, the parties are trying to prevail in a dispute by
convincing a third-party neutral to decide in their favor. In short,
arbitration is an adversarial adjudicatory process, not a settlement
process. 1
85
Still, the judicial efficiency rationale that supports the settlement
discussion rule can and should be extended to other dispute resolution
processes in a manner that is appropriate to those dispute resolution
182. 854 F.2d 900, 903-05 (1988).
183. Id. at 904 (citations omitted).
184. See, e.g., Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992) (refusing to review an
evidently erroneous arbitration award).
185. One could argue that arbitration is a settlement process because it requires the parties to
agree to have their dispute arbitrated rather than tried by a court. The proposition is plausible but not
persuasive as the agreement is only the means by which the dispute comes to arbitration. Party
agreement is not otherwise necessarily a part of the arbitration process itself.
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processes. The Cincinnati Gas court's treatment of the summary jury
trial provides an example of the easy case because the summary jury trial
process is a tool to facilitate negotiated settlement. As such, it
comfortably extends the settlement discussion rule to the tools of
settlement other than one-on-one negotiation. Similarly, the protections
that the UMA and related state laws provide for mediation confidentiality
from discovery and admissibility can be thought of as legislatively
extending this settlement-discussion rationale to mediation.18 6 While the
settlement discussion model may not be appropriate as a vehicle for
extending the judicial efficiency principle to arbitration, the principle is
worth extending nonetheless. Cases that are adjudicated privately
preserve judicial resources just as much as cases that are settled privately
through negotiation and mediation. Indeed, the strong national policy
favoring arbitration discussed above can be seen as an embrace of this
judicial efficiency rationale.
2. Mediation: The Privilege
As we have seen, 187 the protections for mediation confidentiality, like
negotiation, follow two tracks: the power to contract for confidentiality
as against disclosures to third parties, and formal rules limiting the
discovery and admissibility of mediation communications. There are
several different approaches that the states have used to protect
mediation confidentiality. By far, the most common is the privilege
structure. 188
The law of privilege is a doctrine of evidentiary exclusion that
precludes the discovery and admissibility of otherwise relevant evidence,
but does so for extrinsic policy reasons. 8 9 In the case of most so-called
"communications privileges," the policy reason is to foster candor in
certain confidential relationships, such as between attorneys and their
clients, doctors and their patients, priests and penitents, and spouses. 190
186. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (amended 2003), 7A U.L.A. 104, 105 (Supp. 2005) ("These
laws play a limited but important role in encouraging the effective use of mediation and maintaining
its integrity, as well as the appropriate relationship of mediation with the justice system.").
187. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
188. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4 cmt. 2(a) (noting that 21 of the 25 states wth general mediation
confidentiality laws used the privilege structure).
189. JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72 (5th ed. 1999).
190. Id.; see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1996) (recognizing a psychotherapist-
patient privilege, extending it to licensed clinical social workers, and articulating factors to be
considered in recognizing a privilege).
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Because the purpose is to foster communications, communications
privileges typically protect the words of the confidential
communications, not the information within the communication or
conduct that is observed during the communications.1 91  Some
communications privileges, however, can include information within
their sweep, such as the physician-patient privilege, 192 the various
government privileges that protect military and state secrets,1 93 and the
privilege for the identity of informants.' 94  The rationale behind these
privileges is that the confidentiality of the information itself is a
sufficiently vital interest to the individuals or to the country that it is
appropriate to withhold the evidence from the courts. Significantly, the
ability to assert the privilege is limited to a designated holder for both
communications and information privileges, which provides an important
limitation on the exclusion of the evidence, providing the availability of
the exclusion only to those the law intends to benefit from the
exclusion. 195
In the arbitration context, there have been a few court decisions
involving the attorney-client privilege and the related work-product
doctrine. These courts generally have assumed that arbitrations are
proceedings to which the attorney-client privilege' 96 and the work-
product doctrine apply. 197  Thus in a business dispute, Samuels v.
Mitchell,198 for example, a federal magistrate found that arbitration
communications between an attorney and a client were protected from
later discovery because the party's attorney-client privilege had not been
waived. 199  Similarly, in Industrotech Contractors Inc. v. Duke
University, a North Carolina state appeal court rejected, but was willing
to consider, a claim that certain arbitration documents were privileged
191. See STRONG, supra note 189, at § 89.
192. Id. §§ 89, 100. A physician's diagnosis would be an example of information protected that
would be protected by the physician-patient privilege.
193. Id. § 107.
194. Id. § 11.
195. Id. § 73.1.
196. Tekni-Plex, Inc. v. Meyner & Landis, 674 N.E.2d 663, 667 (N.Y. 1996) (assuming
attorney-client privilege applies); Prospective Inv. & Trading Co. v. GBK Corp., 60 P.3d 520, 524
(Okla. Civ. App. 2002) (assuming attorney-client privilege applied in arbitration but decided on
other grounds).
197. Caringal v. Karteria Shipping, Ltd., No. Civ.A 99-3159, 2001 WL 874705, at *1 (E.D. La.
Jan. 24, 2001) (upholding magistrate order to produce arbitration documents); Kamyr, Inc. v.
Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 554 N.Y.S.2d 619, 620 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) ("Evidentiary material in an
arbitration proceeding is not immune from disclosure."); Milone v. General Motors Corp., 446
N.Y.S.2d 650, 651 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (permitting discovery of medical records tendered at no-
fault arbitration).
198. 155 F.R.D. 195 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
199. Id. at 200.
1292 [Vol. 54
HeinOnline  -- 54 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1292 2005-2006
2006] CONFIDENTIALITY IN ARBITRATION: BEYOND THE MYTH
from later discovery and admissibility as "materials 'prepared in
anticipation of litigation,"' or work product.200 And, in an unpublished
opinion, International Ins. Co. v. Peabody Int'l Corp., a trial court judge
found that arbitration documents were discoverable up to the point when
co-parties became adverse, but were protected afterward under the work-
product doctrine.20 1
Such rulings are certainly sensible. Since arbitration is an
adversarial adjudicatory process, it is logical for the courts to apply the
protections for attorney-client communications and for work product in
this context, just as they apply in public adjudication. However, this
approach as a general construct for the protection of arbitration
confidentiality would have only limited effect on the discovery and
admissibility of arbitration communications more generally.
In most cases, the attorney-client privilege presumably would apply
only to communications made in confidence between the attorney and
the client, but not to other communications made during the arbitration,
such as between the attorney and client in the presence of others at the
arbitration, between the attorneys, and between the arbitrator and the
attorneys and/or the parties.02 The class of communications protected
by the attorney-client privilege, therefore, is a presumably small part of
the overall discourse at an arbitration. Since arbitration is an adversarial
process that revolves around the presentation of evidence, there are
potentially many statements and documents rendered during the
arbitration that might be of interest to a third party that would not be
protected by the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine.
Moreover, given that these statements are made in the presence of an
adversary and a third party adjudicator, the candor justification that
generally supports the law of privilege has little force with respect to
these communications.
Similarly, the work-product doctrine is not suitable by itself as a
vehicle for general protection of arbitration confidentiality because it
would only apply to preclude from discovery documents that were made
in preparation for the arbitration by one of the parties.20 3 It would not bar
the discovery of documents that were not specifically prepared for the
arbitration, such as tax, business, medical, or other records.20 4 Nor would
200. See 314 S.E.2d 272, 274-75 (N.C. Ct. App, 1984).
201. No. 87 C 464, 1988 WL 58611, at *3-*5 (N.D. Il1. June 1, 1988).
202. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 136, at 368-74.
203. Id. at 324.
204. Id.
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it preclude discovery of the transcript of the arbitration proceeding
because the transcript generally would not be prepared by one of the
parties, a requirement for the application of the doctrine. °5 More
significantly, perhaps, it would not cover all of the non-documentary
communications described above.
By itself, then the work-product doctrine does not provide a suitable
vehicle for the protection of arbitration confidentiality. However, it does
provide a good vehicle for exploring an alternative approach, which I
discuss below.
3. A Proposal for Arbitration: An Elevated Burden of Proof
As with negotiation and mediation, the challenge is to structure
protection for the confidentiality of arbitration communications in a way
that serves Congress's intent in providing a private adjudicatory
alternative to public courts while at the same time providing sufficient
access to evidence to permit parties the opportunity to prove their cases
at trial. This commitment counsels in favor of a minimal but meaningful
approach to exclusion, and one modest approach is simply to elevate the
level of proof required for the admissibility of arbitration evidence.
The burden of proof for admissibility in the general case is one of
relevance. The proponent of the evidence must establish that the
proposed evidence is logically relevant, legally relevant, and competent
before it will be received into evidence. 0 6 The logical relevance test is
satisfied if the evidence is material to the factual issues in dispute in that
it is of consequence to the determination of the action 20 7 and has
underlying probative value. 20 8  The legal relevance test is met if the
probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for prejudice,
205. Id; see also MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 9, at § 32.6.1; STONE, supra note 1, at 687-89.
206. Evidence law can be found at both the federal and state levels. Because of the wide
variation that exists among states on many issues, my analysis will focus on the federal law of
evidence, specifically the Federal Rules of Evidence.
207. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 states the general rule of logical relevance, and provides:
"'Relevant' evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."
208. For a classic statement of relevance, see George F. James, Relevancy, Probability and the
Law, 29 CAL. L. REV. 689, 690 (1941):
Relevancy ... exists as a relation between an item of evidence and a proposition sought
to be proved. If an item of evidence tends to prove or disprove any proposition, it is
relevant to that proposition. If the proposition itself is one provable in the case at bar, or
if it in turn forms a further link in a chain of proof the final proposition of which is
provable in the case at bar, then the offered item of evidence has probative value in the
case.
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confusion, or to be misleading to the trier of fact.20 9 Finally, the evidence
is competent when it is not barred by some other rule of evidence, such
as the assertion of a privilege. When these conditions are met, the
evidence may be received.
The law at times will add additional requirements because of the
special character of proffered evidence. A good example is the work
product doctrine discussed briefly above, which requires the proponent
of the evidence to demonstrate that it is otherwise unavailable and is
necessary for the resolution of the case. The doctrine, laid out in
Hickman v. Taylor210 and later codified in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(3), 2 11 provides a shield for discovery for materials that
are prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for a party or that party's
representative. 21 2  As the Hickman court noted, the purpose of the
doctrine is to protect the attorney's privacy in the performance of her
duties as a lawyer advancing the rights of her clients.21 3 But the court
also noted several other interests that are served by a rule that shields
lawyers from the possibility of discovery of materials developed in the
course of client representation. Specifically, the court was concerned
about the potential chilling effect the threat of discovery would have on
an attorney's willingness to put sensitive issues in writing, which in turn
would have a deleterious effect on the quality of client representation.
21 4
209. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403, which states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." The concept of legal relevance is often traced to John Henry
Wigmore. See David Crump, On the Uses of Irrelevant Evidence, 34 HoUS. L. REv. 1, 8-9. The
term "legally irrelevant" is sometimes used to describe this evidence. See, e.g., Edwin J.
Immwinkelried, The Worst Evidence Principle: The Best Hypothesis as to the Logical Structure of
Evidence Law, 46 MIAMI L. REv. 1069, 1084-86 (1992).
210. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
211. In relevant part, the rule provides:
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this
rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including
the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the
preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery
of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of
an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
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The court was also concerned with the "demoralizing" effect on the legal
profession that would arise with the free discovery of attorney work
product.
215
It is difficult to draw too much of a comparison between the
attorney-client relationship and an arbitration hearing, although some of
the concerns articulated in Hickman have at least some resonance in the
arbitration context. The most significant of these is the potential chilling
effect on the willingness of parties to use arbitration if they know that
their statements and documents are discoverable and admissible. Just as
society benefits from the zealous representation of client interests in the
work product context, society also benefits when disputants are able to
exercise personal autonomy in the selection of a dispute resolution
process.
More important, perhaps, is the intensity of society's interest in the
privacy of the forum. In Hickman, the court recognized the importance
of privacy to the attorney-client relationship, observing:
Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble
information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the
irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy
without undue and needless interference. That is the historical
and the necessary way in which lawyers act within the
framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and
to protect their clients' interests. 6
While the arbitration hearing does not rise to the law office's level of
privacy sanctity as a matter of process, its privacy sanctity is conferred
by act of Congress. As discussed above, the legislature enacted the FAA
to reverse the ouster doctrine in order to compel courts to enforce
agreements to arbitrate so that parties could, if they so desire, choose a
private adjudicatory process for the resolution of their disputes that
would be enforceable by the government. Though they come from
different sources, the mantle of privacy provides a common baseline for
both of these venues of potentially discoverable communications. It also
suggests that the exceptions found in the work product doctrine-
unavailability and necessity-will also operate effectively in the
arbitration context, an issue I turn to next.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 511.
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a. Unavailability
As in the work product context, a requirement that the sought-after
evidence is unavailable preserves arbitration confidentiality by ensuring
that the arbitration is invaded for evidence only as a last resort, rather
than a first resort. This is appropriate because of the premium that has
been placed on arbitration confidentiality by Congress's enactment of the
FAA to provide a private alternative to public adjudication, by the
reasonable expectations of privacy shared by parties who contract for
arbitration under the Act, and by the strong national policy favoring
arbitration as a dispute resolution policy.
Evidence coming from an arbitration should be viewed as "second
class" evidence that is similar in posture to the special set of hearsay
exceptions when the declarant is unavailable. 217 Federal Rule of
Evidence 804 codifies the common law by providing, for certain types of
statements, 218 an exception to the general rule that hearsay cannot be
used to prove the truth of the matter asserted in situations, where, for
example the declarant is dead,219 out of the jurisdiction,22 ° or is exempted
from testimony because of a privilege. 221  The purpose of these
exceptions is to provide parties with the access to the evidence that is
necessary to prove their cases, while at the same time expressing a
preference for live evidence.222
In the same way, a requirement that the arbitration communications
evidence is otherwise unavailable expresses a preference that the
evidence be received from the traditional sources of discovery if at all
possible. Letters, records, and other documents that might be sought will
often be available from the parties or their counsel, such that there is no
need to get them from an arbitrator or service provider. Where the
evidence is not otherwise available, however, it should be made available
from the arbitration. This element simply requires them to seek the
evidence from sources other than the arbitration first.
217. GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 284 (2nd ed. 1987).
218. These statements include former testimony, statements made under the belief in impending
death, statements against interest, and statements of personal or family history. FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(1-4).
219. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(4).
220. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(5).
221. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1).
222. LILLY, supra note 217, at 284.
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b. Necessity
Similarly, the second threshold requirement-necessity-preserves
the confidentiality of arbitration communications by assuring that the
arbitration will only be invaded when it is necessary to do so. At the
same time, it provides a reciprocal assurance to parties seeking evidence
that they will be able to access evidence that is crucial to their case. The
standard here is high, and courts should deny such requests when the
sought-after evidence is peripheral, duplicative, or otherwise non-
essential. 223 Critically, assessment of need is a factual determination that
is made on a case-by-case basis.224 Necessity was not found in Hickman
v. Taylor by counsel's assertions that he just wanted to make sure he had
not overlooked anything. 225 On the other hand, necessity was suggested
in Hickman by a showing that the material sought would be helpful in
impeaching a witness, 226 even though it was not found in another case
where counsel merely suspected the material might be helpful in
impeaching a witness.22 7
The elevated standard of proof I am proposing strikes the right
balance between the competing needs of arbitration and trial by
adequately protecting arbitration communications and intruding
minimally on the evidentiary needs of trial. It neither categorically
exposes nor disables arbitration communications evidence, and instead
provides courts with specific guidance in determining whether to admit
such evidence. In so doing it also provides parties in arbitration with a
basis for confidence that their communications will be received into
evidence only if absolutely necessary, and litigants at trial with the
comfort of knowing they can access the arbitration communications
evidence if they really need it and it is otherwise unavailable. In this
sense, the elevated burden of proof functions something like a rebuttable
presumption of inadmissibility of arbitration communications evidence,
223. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2) offers a good model, providing that a federal court
may deny discovery requests:
if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,
or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less
expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the
action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.
224. See Fletcher v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 194 F.R.D. 666, 671 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (stating that the
element of substantial need may be "demonstrated by establishing that the facts contained in the
requested documents are essential elements of the requesting party's prima facie case").
225. 329 U.S. 495, 512-13 (1947).
226. Id. at 511.
227. Smith v. Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 582, 586 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
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although not in the technical sense of a formal evidentiary presumption
that would require rebuttal evidence for the communications to be
introduced.22 8
IV. CONCLUSION
Arbitration is an important vehicle for the resolution of disputes,
supported by a strong national policy favoring the arbitration of disputes.
One of the potential advantages of the process is that it is private. Third
parties can be prevented from observing the proceedings. Parties to the
arbitration can contract to prevent each other from disclosing arbitration
communications to third parties. And arbitrators are ethically bound to
preserve this confidentiality unless otherwise required by law.
Less clear is whether the law can require the disclosure of those
arbitration communications for purposes of discovery and admission in
another legal proceeding. The emerging view of the courts appears to be
that such disclosures may be compelled-a position that would
undermine congressional intent to endorse a private alternative to public
adjudication because once they are introduced, such communications
would become public records that may be disseminated freely as a
general matter. The continuation of this trend would undermine the
national policy favoring arbitration by frustrating the parties' reasonable
expectations with respect to the confidentiality of arbitration, ultimately
chilling use of the arbitration process.
The law's expectation of access to these materials is not trivial,
however, and proper legal policy must reflect a balance of these
competing public and private interests. This balance may be struck by
raising the burden of proof for the admission of evidence sought from
arbitration proceedings by requiring the proponent of such evidence to
demonstrate that it is otherwise unavailable and necessary for the
resolution of the case.
228. The evidentiary presumption is a required conclusion in the absence of countervailing
evidence. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS
630-32 (2nd ed. 1988); see also EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 32 (1963)
(defining presumption and articulating reasons for their creation); FED. R. EVID. 30 1:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by
these rules, a presumption imposes upon the party against whom it is directed the burden
of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to
such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains
throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
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The adoption of an elevated standard will not resolve all questions
regarding the confidentiality of arbitration communications. Legitimate
questions may be raised, for example, about just who has the power to
prevent a third party from attending an arbitration, and how far that
power may reach. Can the media, for example, be barred from an
arbitration? What if the government is a party? On these questions,
there is, again, little statutory or common law at present, and the few
court rulings on the question have suggested that there are circumstances
under which the media's interest in attending and reporting on an
arbitration may trump a confidentiality clause to arbitrate or internal
organizational rules calling for the confidentiality of arbitration. 29
Such issues merit closer attention. As arbitration continues to
expand as a fixture on the landscape of civil justice, it becomes more
important for participants in the process to be aware of the contours of
arbitration's relationship with the law, of the limitations of arbitration as
well as its strengths. As with the discovery and admissibility of
mediation communications, a rigorous inquiry is a necessary foundation
for good legal policy with respect to arbitration communications. Like
any alternative dispute resolution process, arbitration does not stand apart
from the law, and when the two come into contact, wise policy requires a
careful balancing of the needs, interests, and concerns of both
institutions.
229. Not surprisingly, there is little statutory or common law at present on the question. The few
court rulings on the question have suggested that there are circumstances under which the media's
interest in attending and reporting on an arbitration may trump a confidentiality clause in an
agreement to arbitrate or internal organizational rules calling for the confidentiality of arbitration.
See, e.g., Lederman v. Shapiro, 897 A.2d 362, 371 (2006) ("Public policy favoring arbitration cannot
sanction what here became essentially secret proceedings."); Boone v. City of Suffolk, 79 F. Supp.
2d 603 (E.D. Va. 1999) (federal and state common law ight of access required city's settlement with
a police union to be unsealed).
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